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This paper studies the vaIue of a bank under different banking policy regimes.
As banks run into financial distress, authorities in different countries have used
different approaches to deal with the crisis. The Nordic countries provide
examples of different policy approaches. The results show that the uncertainty
over the banking policy regime and changes in this uncertainty can have a
major impact on the value dynamies of bank shares. The model produces moral
hazard problems both before and after public sector intervention. On the other
hand, bank support can increase the original shareholders' incentive to inject
new capital into the bank. The model also impiies that the govemment may
have an incentive to cheat the bank's shareholders in order to ensure more
capital injections from them.
Tiivistelmä
Työssä tutkitaan teoreettisesti pankin arvon määräytymistä erilaisissa pankkitu-
kipolitiikan vaihtoehdoissa. Eri maat ovat toimineet eri tavoin, kun pankkisekto-
ri on ajautunut vaikeuksiin. Pohjoismaat tarjoavat esimerkin erilaisista lähesty-
mistavoista. Työn tulosten mukaan epävarmuus pankkitukiregiimistä ja muutok-
set tässä epävarmuudessa voivat vaikuttaa olennaisesti pankin osakkeen arvoon.
Malli tuottaa vääristyneitä kannustinongelmia sekä ennen julkisen sektorin inter-
ventiota että sen jälkeen. Toisaalta, pankkituki voi lisätä osakkeenomistajien
kannustimia tehdä lisäsijoituksia pankkiin. Lisäksi julkisella sektorilla voi olla
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The paper focuses on the valuation of banks under different banking policy
regimes. The main purpose is to study the dynamics of a bank's value as it
experiences into financial distress and the impact of different banking policy
regimes on this dynamics.
The properties of the bank common stocks differ from those of
corporations as the banks' earnings process differ from the corporations'
earnings process. The publie sector regulates banks and their earnings more
than it regulates corporations. Banks are regulated by solvency ratios, audits
and restrictions on banks investment behaviour.
From the investor's viewpoint, one of the most important questions
regarding future eamings and public regulation is how the publie sector will
react if the bank falls into financial distress. Banks differ from corporations in
that they are rarely allowed to go bankrupt. Instead they are either financially
reorganized or bailed outo This is especially true for large banks.
Furthermore, there are clear differences in how the public sector reacts to a
banking crisis. The Nordic countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s provide a
good example of different approaches. In Norway the original shareholders'
equity in large commercial banks was nullified in the early years of the banking
crisis. In Sweden and Finland, this has not been the case, as publie policy has
been aimed more at helping the banks obtain funding from the markets. The
Nordic cases are discussed in more detail in section 2.
In summary, from the shareholders point of view there are at least two
distinct sources of uncertainty connected with a banking crisis. First, how will
an individual bank cope? Secondly, how will the public sector react to the
problems that arise? WiIl the govemment try to help the bank obtain funding or
will it take control of the immediately? These questions provide the motivation
for this paper.
1 present a simplified model for bank valuation. Bank earnings are
modelled as a reguIated Brownian motion. The banking policy regime
determines how the earnings are regulated. The emphasis is on capital
instruments, not on the valuation of deposit insurance. The simplified model
facilitates discussion of the valuation issues and moraI hazard problems raised
by bank support. Moral hazard problems can appear both before and after
government intervention. Furthermore, it is shown that government behaviour
can also entail moral hazard problems.
The approach used in this paper can be compared to the traditionai deposit
insurance Iiterature (Merton (1977, 1978), Pennacchi (1987)). This literature
focuses the vaIue of deposit insurance and possible moral hazard problems
raised by mispricing. This paper focuses on the management of a banking crisis
and the valuation of banks' capital instruments. The paper takes deposit
insurance and the valuation there of as given. The differences between different
bank support regimes are in how the public sector treats banks' capital
instruments if a bank falls into financial distress.
However, the approach taken here can also be used to study the fair price
of deposit insurance. This is done in Fries, MeIla-Barral and Perraudin (1994)
(see also Fries, Mason and Perraudin (1993)). Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin
(1994) study the fair price of a deposit guarantee and endogenous closure rules.
7They model the deposit guarantee as a perpetual American put written by the
government on the bank's assets and exercised optimally by the bank's
shareholders. They study the actuarially fair deposit insurance rate, among other
things. Below 1 will take deposit insurance and the deposit insurance fee as
given and concentrate on the valuation of bank shares. More specifically, the
earnings process specified below is assumed to present the earnings dynamies
in the presence of deposit insurance and a deposit insurance fee.
The pIan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the Nordic banking
crisis. Section 3 presents the basic model. In section 4 I discuss the valuation of
a bank with the shareholders having the option of abandoning it. This is the
benchmark case. Section 5 discuss the value of a bank under different banking
policy regimes. The final section contains concIuding comments.
2 Nordic examples
1n this section I discuss the banking policies in different Nordic countries.
In Finland, Norway and Sweden the banking industry run into severe
difficulties which led to severe crises in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
bank support needed to deal with the crisis was of a considerable magnitude.
The total amount as a percentage of GDP in 1989-1993 was 14.7 % in Finland,
4.5 % in Norway and 6.2 % in Sweden (Koskenkylä (1994)). The amount of
govemment support provided to the banking sector was higher relative to GDP
in each of the Nordic countries than, for example, in the United States (see BIS
(1993)). 1n each of Sweden, Norway and Finland only two of the major
commercial banks have managed to get by without direct government support
(as of December 1994).
The main factors behind the crisis were the same in the three countries:
very rapid lending growth and the acquirement of new customers prior to the
crisis, bad credit screening and pricing policies, poor banking supervision and,
finally, severe macroeconomic problems. See Koskenkylä (1994), Koskenkylä
and Vesala (1994), Murto (1994), NOU (1992), Nyberg and Vihriälä (1994),
Steigum (1992).1
The Nordic countries differ, however, in how they reacted to the banking
crisis. This is true especially concerning the fate of the shareholders. Table 1
presents different bank support measures concerning commercial banks in
Finland, Norway and Sweden.
2
1n Norway, the policy was straightforward. The banking crisis started 1987
and by 1991 alI the major commercial banks were under state contral. During
1 Denmark differs from the other Nordic countries in the respect that the banking industry did
not fall into an acute crisis and did not need large govemment support. The publie support to
banks has been clearly smaller than in the other Nordic countries and directed to a few small
and medium-sized banks.
2 In addition to commercial banks, the savings banks sector in different Nordic countries were
hit by banking crisis. For example, in Finland the majority of the savings banks ceased to exist,
as most of the independent savings bank were merged to a single bank, which was later soId in
parts to it's competitors.
81991 the Government Bank Insurance Fund acquired full ownership af the
second and third largest commercial bank of Norway: Christiania Bank and
Fokus bank. Shareholders' equity was nullified. Majority ownership of the
largest Norwegian bank, Den norske Bank, also fell ta the state in 1991. Den
norske ~ank's original shareholders equity was written down to zero in March
1993. See more on NOU (1992).
By contrast, in Sweden and Finland public policy was aimed more at
keeping the banks or at least most of the banks in private hands. In Sweden this
was stated explicitly in a bill approved by the parliament on 18 December
1992. In summary it states that "the State shall not endeavour to become an
owner af banks or other credit institutions."
Banks that remained independent were supported by capital injections and
by help in funding themselves directly from the market. The latter aim was
achieved by providing guarantees, resolutions and using so-called bad banks.
The aim was to bridge the recession (see Nyberg and Vihriälä (1994), Lind and
Nedersjö (1994), Murto and Eirola (1993)).
In Sweden Nordbanken, in which the state has had a majority holding, was
split into two parts: Nordbanken and Securum. Nordbanken's bad loans were
transferred to Securum. The state injected new capital into Nordbanken and
issued a guarantee on a loan from Nordbanken to Securum. A smaIl commercial
bank, Gotabank, also felI into financial distress. As a result, it's initial share
capital was nullified and it was merged to Nordbanken.
In Finland the attempt to assist banks through the recession can be seen
from the general support given to the banks. As a general support measure, the
government provided the banks with a capital injection totalling FIM 8 billion
in March 1992. The capital injection took the form of investments in preferred
capital certificates issued by the banks (see also section 5). Furthermore, the
parliament approved a resolution in February 1993, stating that "Parliament
requires the state to guarantee that Finnish banks are able to meet their
commitments on time under alI circumstances". The resolution is very close to
the Swedish resolution mentioned above.
The Government Guarantee Fund in Finland has also decided, in principle,
to support major banks with guarantees to be used when raising risk capital on
international markets. So far, the banks have not used this facility.
Not alI commercial banks remained independent or in private ownership in
Finland. The Bank of Finland took control of Skopbank, which was the savings
banks' commercial bank. Later the Government Guarantee Fund, which was
formed in 1992, acquired the ownership of the bank. 1ndividual investors who
had a minority ownership of the Skopbank have kept their share capital.
Furthermore, the good assets of the small commercial banks, STS Bank, were
sold to one of the large commercial banks, Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. Since the
transaction the STS Bank (renamed Siltapankki) has been an asset management
company for bad assets, i.e. a bad bank. 1n January 1995, two leading Finnish
commercial banks, KansaIlis-Osake-Pankki and Union Bank of Finland,




Nordic commercial banks and state support
The original share capital was nullified in December 1991. The fonner shareholders were
offered a call option on up to 25 per cent of the Government Bank Insurance Fund. As a result
2.3 per cent of the shares passed into private hands. During December 1993, Christiana Bank
issued shares to both domestic and foreign investors. At the same time the Government Bank
Insurance Fund converted its suordinated loan into ordinary shares as well. After these
transactions, the State's holding in Christiania Bank fell to 69 %.
(ii) Fokus bank
The original share capital was nullified in December 1991. As in the case of Cristiania Bank,
the fonner shareholders were offered a call option. The sale was, however, postponed in the
case of Fokus bank.
(iii) Den norske Bank
Den norske Bank is the Norway's largest commercial bank. The original share capitaI was
written down by 90 % in 1992 through a reduction in the par vaIue of a share from NKr 100 to
Nkr 10. The remaining orginal share capital was nullified in March 1993. The new share
offering for private investors was arranged in the first half of 1994. After the share offering the
state owned 72 % of the bank.
(iv) General measures
As a general support measure, an arrangement was introduced in 1991 involving loans on
special tenns from the central bank, which carried appreciably lower interest rates than other
loans from the central bank. These so-called G-Ioans were abolished in December 1993.
SWEDEN
(i) Nordbanken
Nordbanken was a commercial bank in which the state had majority ownership. It has been
supported by several means, including capital injections and guarantees. Nordbanken was
restructured in 1992; its bad assets were transferred to a separate asset management company,
Securum. The private owners shares were bought back at a price corresponding to the price at
which shareholders could buy shares that had been issued a year earlier.
(ii) Gotabank
Gota Bank was the smallest of Sweden's major commercial banks. Gota-Holding, parent to Gota
Bank, filed for bankruptcy in September 1992. The bank was merged with Nordbanken. The
initial share capital was nullified and bad assets were transferred to the separate asset
management company, Retriva.
(iii) Other banks and general measures
In December 1992 the parliament passed an Act providing government support to all Swedish
banks. According to the bill the State guarantees that banks and certain other credit institutions
can meet their commitments on a timely basis. The State shall not endeavour ta become an
owner of banks. The support can be provided in the form 10ans, guarantees, capital contributions
and other appropriate measures.
10In 1991 over 300 cooperative bank merged into one bank, Föreningsbank.Föreningsbank
acquired a guarantee from Bankstödsnämn~d in 1993. The state is committed to inject SEK 2.5
billion in share capital if the capital ratio (BIS) is in danger of falling below 8 per cent.
FINLAND
(i) Skopbank
Skopbank was a commercial bank owned by savings banks and individual investors. The
savings banks had nearly 92 % of the voting rights before the Bank of Finland stepped in.
Skopbank encountered severe problems and the Bank of Finland intervened in October 1990.
The private owners have kept their share capital.
(ii) STS Bank
STS Bank was a small commercial bank whose status had been changed from that of a saving
bank. It's good assets were transferred to a larger commercial bank, Kansallis-Osake-Pankki.
Kansallis bought the majority of STS Bank shares at a price close to the market price, but
substantially beIow their nominal vaIue. The bad assets remained in STS Bank, which was
renamed Siltapankki. The Government Guarantee Fund is responsible for 90 per cent and
Kansallis 10 per cent of the loan losses.
(iv) Other banks and general measures
As a general support measure, the government provided the banks with a capital injection
totalling FIM 8 billion in 1992. 1t was given in exchange for preferred capital certificates. The
last time for capital injection was in December 1992. All the major banks have obtained this
type of aid.
1n 1992 most of the independent savings banks were merged into single bank, the Savings
Bank of Finland (SBF). SBF was soId to its competitors in 1993. The bad Ioans were
transferred to an asset management company, Arsenal Ltd. .
In February 1993 the parliament approved a resolution confirming the state's commitment
to support the banking system. The tone of the resolution is very similar to its Swedish
counterpart.
In 1993 the Government Guarantee Fund decided that certain specified banks can, in
principIe, use state quarantees in acquiring risk capital from international markets. The banks
were the major commerciaI banks, Kansallis-Osake-Pankki and Union Bank af Finland, and the
cooperative banks.
113 The basic model
In this section 1 present a simple framework for valuing banks under different
banking policy regimes.
1 write the earnings dynamics as follows:
de =Jldt +crdW, (1)
where W is a standard Wiener process. 1 assume that the drift Jl is strictly
positive. Note that e(t) is not speculative price and therefore, e(t) < 0 does not
violate the limited liability condition. fl and cr are measured in markka (or $)
(see Merton (1993)).
It is assumed that equation (1) gives the eamings dynamics in the presence
of deposit insurance and fl is the earnings drift net of any deposit insurance fee.
In the following 1 focus on the valuation of bank shares which are not covered
by deposit insurance.
1 assume that the investor receives the cash flow e(t) at time 1.3 Thus the
bank distributes alI earnings to the owners. This impiies that capital rations are
not discussed here. Negative earnings impIy that owners must make capital
injections to the bank.
Let V(e) denote the value of a bank at time t for e =e(t). By Ito's lemma,
the expected change in the value of the bank is
E(dV) =[V'(e)J.l+Y2V"(e)cr
2]dt, (2)
where the primes denote the partiaI derivatives of V with respect to e. The
standard deviation of its retum is V'(e) crN(e). The price appreciation
(equation 2) plus cash flow give us the total instantaneous retum that the
owners of the bank expect to receive. In order to vaIue the bank 1 have to
combine the expected instantaneous return with the equilibrium valuation
mode!.
Let Y be the price of an asset ar dynamic portfolio of assets perfectly
correlated with dW, so that
dY =ayYdt +cryYdW. (3)
Then by the CAPM, the risk-adjusted expected retun on Y is cxy = r + ypcry ,
where CXy is the required rate of return on asset Y, r is the risk-free rate, y is the
market price of risk and dW dWM =pdt.
4
From equilibrium pricing it follows that V satisfies the following ordinary
second-order differentiaI equation:
3 Where it does not create confusion, 1 drop the time-dependence notation.
4 Alternatively we could assume that investors' preferences are logarithmic and obtain the risk
premium from Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985).
12o=e +AV'(e) +Y2cr2V''(e) -rV(e) (4)
where A= fl - ycr.
AlI soIutions of (4) are Iinear combinationS of the particular solution and of
soIutions for the its homogenous part,. in the form
(5)
where A1 and A2 are constant parameters, which are to be determined by the
boundary conditions. Pl and ~2 are the roots of the quadratic equation:
The particular soIution is




Further insight to the particular soIution can be obtained by taking the
expectation of the future cash flow under the risk-adjusted probability measure
and discounting at the risk free rate. This can be carried out by changing the
drift of e(t) to A= fl - ya.
Equation (7) gives us the vaIue of the bank's earnings stream when the
earnings stream folIow a (unreguIated) Brownian motion. V(e) is the vaIue of
the bank assuming uniimited Iiability. Note that there is nothing to prevent V(e)
from being negative given that e(t) can be negative. In order to vaIue common
stock 1 have to restrict the behaviour of the earnings process. This is done in
the next section by modelling earnings as a regulated Brownian motion.





Equation (8) forms the basis of the forthcoming anaIysis. 1 proceed ta model
different banking policy regimes by assuming different boundary conditions for
V(e). The different assumptions about the behaviour af the earnings process
andJor value process at the different boundaries lead to different market value
dynamics.
134 Value of a bank and the option to abandon
As a first specific example of banking policy, 1 consider the case where the
bank is closed in a prespecified lower boundary. This means that there is a
lower limit for e(t). In the case of common stock, the reorganization impiies
that eD is an absorbing barrier and V(eD) is zero. In other words, shareholders
lose their investments whenever e(t) hits the lower barrier.
The above impiies that 1 can write the boundary condition
(9)
Furthermore, we assume that bubbles are not possible. As the earnings approach
00 the likehood of hitting the lower boundary becomes smaller and smaller.
Thus the value of the bank should approach it's intrinsic value without the
lower boundary. This is represented by equation (7). Thus
limh(e) =0. (10)
If the ~2 is the negative root, then A1 is equal to zero. This leaves A2 to be
determined.
Using the above boundary conditions we can rewrite the bank's market
value as follows:
(11)
where ~2 is [-(A? + 2cr2r)~ - A]/cr
2
, which is the negative root of equation (6).
Equation (11) has a simple interpretation. The first part af the right-hand
side, ').../[2 + e/r, represents the discounted value of the earnings stream in the
absence of an option to abandon the bank as discussed in the previous section.
The second part is more interesting. It is the negative of the expected
discounted value of a claim to the bank's earnings stream when it first reaches
eD given that earnings currently equal e(t). It is the amount of asset value lost in
the case of financial reorganization. The earnings stream is discounted by the
average discount faetor weighted by the probability that the earnings process
hits the absorbing barrier at a given time (see Karlin and Taylor (1975), p.
362). The weight depends on the earnings (risk-adjusted) drift, the volatility of
the eamings, the riskless discount rate and distance between the earnings and
the absorbing barrier.
The owners have an option to liquidate the bank. Thus they can close the
bank at the level eD which they can choose (assuming that the publie sector
14does not intervene).5 This impiies that the owners ehoose the vaIue e;, whieh
maximizes the vaIue of stoek, i.e. e; is the soIution to the foIIowing
maximizing probIem:
(12)
The eorresponding vaIue of e~ is 1/~2 - A/r. The resuIts imply, among other
things, that the term (Alr + e~/r) in equation (12) is negative. The owner of the
eommon stoek is better off as stoek earries Iimited rather than uniimited
liability. The option to abandon the bank has a positive vaIue.
6 The market
vaIue of the future earnings stream is greater with the absorbing barrier in e;
than without the absorbing barrier. It ean be aIso shown that the vaIue of the
bank is greater than zero when e ~ e~.7
Note aIso that e~ is lower than the Ievel at whieh the diseounted expeeted
earnings for an unregulated Brownian motion hits zero. This is beeause by
regulating the earnings proeess an investor ean eut out the possibIe Iarge
negative vaIues of e(t).
5 Role of the banking policy regime
5.1 Intervention with certainty
Above we assumed that sharehoIders make the deeision to abandon
independently of publie authorities. In this seetion 1 diseuss the role of banking
poliey. More speeifieally, 1 model the banking poIiey where the publie seetor
intervenes in order ta prevent the bankruptey.
The main assumptions are as foIIows. 1 assume that there is a Iower Iimit
for e(t) set by the publie seetor, denoted as eD. When earnings hit the lower
Iimit, the publie sector intervenes by moving earnings from eD to eE. The publie
seetor subsidizes a bank. The level of eE is a poIiey variable. This impiies that
there is a jump in the eamings proeess when e(t) hits the Iower boundary.
From the shareholders' point of view, however, there is a eost of
intervention. The publie sector wiII in the future eollect a fixed fee, e, from the
banks' earnings proeess if the intervention oecurs. The publie sector eolleets e
5 For a model in which the deposit insurer chooses the point at which to close the bank, see
Allen and Saunders (1993). They mode1 deposit insurance as a callable put. The call has a vaIue
if the stockho1ders choose to close the bank later than the regulator. The corresponding anaIysis
could also be done here.
6 This is analogous to the results presented in the rea1 option literature (see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)).
7 By evaluating V'(e) at the e; it can be seen that V'(e;) = o. Thus, the vaIue matching
condition implies the smooth pasting condition (see Dumas (1991)).
15only after the bank has restored it's profitability. This impiies that c is collected
only when the earnings are above some trigger level eL (on condition that the
intervention has occurred).
The example mimics some of the features of Finnish policy. The Finnish
Govem~ent decided in March 1992 to provide the banks with a capital
injection totalling FIM 8 billion. The injection was provided in exchange for
preferred capital certificates. The certificates are regarded as Tier 1 capital. The
instrument carries a non-cumulative retum. The certificates can be converted
into voting stock if interest remains unpaid for three years in succession (or the
bank's solvency ratio falls below the legally required minimum). Thus one of
the aims seems to be to provide banks a bridge over the bad years. Note that it
is possible that banks will not pay interest in the first three years after which
banks can refund the certificates if they are willing and able to do so. Banks
acquired FIM 7.9 billion of new capital for the certificates.8
The above considerations lead us to the following ordinary differential
equations using the arguments presented in section 3.
V(e) =~ +~V'(e)+yz (32 V"(e)
r r r
if intervention has not occurred or
if intervention has occurred and e < eLo
e c A cr
2
V(e)=---+-V'(e) +Y2-V"(e)
r r r r
if intervention has occurred and e ~ eLo
The corresponding solutions are the following:
if intervention has not occurred,





8 At the end af August 1992, after the banks had raised FIM 4.9 billion af capital for
certificates, their Tier 1 capital was FIM 26.2 billian.
16A e c
Vc(e,1)=-+- +CI exp(~Ie) +C2exp(~2e)--
~ r r
if intervention has occurred and e ~ eLe
(8e)
VA (e, 0) denotes the value of the bank if intervention has not oceurred and
VB(e, 1) and Vc(e, 1) if intervention has oecurred. The constants in the solutions
are determined using the foIlowing boundary conditions.
Consider first the soIution after the intervention has occurred. The same
arguments as above ean be used to determine CI in case e ~ eLe By aIIowing the
vaIue of the bank to approach it's instrict vaIue as earnings approach infinity
we can set eI to zero.
Furthermore, 1 equate the vaIues and derivatives of the two component
soIutions at eLo Thus we have VB(eL, 1) =VC(eL, 1) and V~(eL' 1) = V~(eL' 1).
The extra boundary condition comes from the requirement that VB(en, 1) =
VB(eE, 1). This is again the value matehing condition arising from the arbitrage
arguments. 1 assume that eE < eLe
These Iead to three equations in the unknowns B1, B2 and C2, as presented




We can now obtain the solution for V(e(t), 0). Again we assume that eE < eLe
Using the same arguments as above, we ean set A1 to zero. Next, we use the
vaIue matehing eondition, which states that the vaIue of the banks just prior to
intervention corresponds to their vaIue at eE after the intervention, i.e.
VA(eD, 0) = VB(eE, 1). (See appendix equation A4).
The above boundary conditions yieId the following solution for VA(e,O):
17(16)
As above, the solution consists of two parts. The first part is the same as in the
case of uniimited liability. The second part is considerabIy more compIicated.
9
The numericaI exampIes heIp to iIIustrate the properties of the solution.
The foIlowing parameter vaIues are used unless otherwise stated: A= 0.1,
r = 0.05, (j = 0.25, eD = -1.0, eE = 0.0 and eL = 0.5.
Figure 1 shows V(e, 0) for c = 0.05 and c = 1.0. The most striking feature
in the case where c =0.05 is that vaIue of the bank does not react
monotonicalIy to changes in earnings. At certain earnings leveIs the decrease in
earnings increases the vaIue of the bank. As the earnings decrease the
probabiIity of the hitting the Iower boundary increases. In the same time a Iow
vaIue of c impiies that thepublie sector does not price its subsidy flow at the
market vaIue.
lO Thus at certain earnings Ievels decreases in eamings are more
than offset by increase in the expected vaIue of bank support. This is one
















9 We assume that the eo, eu and c are ehosen so that the shareholders do not have an incentive
to eIose the bank. Thus we assume that the the option to abandon the bank has zero vaIue.
Correspondingly, we assume that V(e,O) and V(e,I) > 0 for all feasible values of e (limited
liability).
10 In principle one ean estimate the amount of subsidy by calcuIating the difference between
V(e,I) or V(e,O) and V(e) Le. the vaIues with and without bank support.
18The Norwegian commission on the banking crisis,.which was appointed to asses
the extent and causes of the banking crisis, discllsses on these issues in its
report, NOU (1992, p. 36). There was a clear increase in commerciaI banks'
provisions for Iosses on Ioans and guarantees in the second half of 1991. The
commission suspects that the increases in provisions can be partly explained by
the change in the banks' policy. As it became more apparent that banks would
become entirely dependent on govemment capital injections, there was no
Ionger an incentive to maintain a Iow IeveI of provisions om order to achieve
higher earnings.
11 In the Commission's view, however, the main reason for the
change in policy was intensified efforts to assess problem assets as the banking
crisis become evident.
Figure 2 shows the reaction of bank value to changes in (j, with c = 0.05
and the other parameters as defined above. The lines two graphs give the share
values for cr = 0.4 and 0.2. If the stated policy is implemented, the shareholders
may have an incentive to lower the expected eamings and increase the
volatility. This is just another characterization of the moraI hazard problem:
shareholders may be inclined to take more risk than otherwise.
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Figure 3 shows V(e, 1) Le. the value of the bank after intervention has occurred.
The parameter values are as above with the exception that c = 2.8 and
en =-0.5. The Iater parameter values are chosen to illustrate the possibility of
rather twisted reactions to changes in earnings.
The value af a bank can react very differently to a change in the earnings
depending on the eamings level. Note that vaIue reacts 'differentIy to changes in
earnings depending on whether the eamings are ta the Ieft or right of eL. This is
because to the right af eL shareholders are charged a fixed cost, c. The vaIue of
11 A similar change in policy can be found regarding the Savings Bank of Finland. The credit
losses increased dramatically after the individual banks were merged to the single bank and the
government became the majority owner in the bank.





The value of a bank after intervention
-0.5 -0.375 -0.25 -0.125 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875
earnings
This example illustrates that intervention by the public sector can disturb
shareholders' incentives in two ways. First, before the intervention the
shareholder may have an incentive to move the earnings to the lower boundary,
which triggers intervention. Secondly, after the intervention shareholders may
have an incentive not to increase eamings to the level where they have to pay
the fee to the publie sector (i.e. repay the govemment support).
In summary, the moral hazard problems can arise both before and after
intervention. However, it seems likely that one should expect moral hazard
problems to be more severe before intervention than after intervention. Here the
moral hazard problem after intervention relies on the assumption of a specific
financial contract due to the intervention. The example is merely a
demonstration of the possible twisted reactions triggered by publie policy.
5.2 Modelling the uncertainty of the future banking
policy regime
Above we assumed that the publie sector would intervene with certainty if the
earnings level hits the lower boundary. In many countries there is no explicit
policy of government support of banks in financial distress. Investors are
uncertain about future banking poliey. This was evident, for exarnple, in
Finland during the first years af the banking crisis. There was considerable
discussion in the press of whether or not Finland would follow the Norwegian
approach, i.e. nullify the original share capital. The authorities also participated
in that discussion. 1n this section 1 analyze this uncertainty.
As above, 1 assume that there is a lower limit for e(t). Whenever e(t)
reaches the limit, the authorities intervene. 1 assume that the authorities have
20two alternatives. First, they can force the bank into financial reorganization and
nullify the initial share capita1, implying that en is a absorbing barrier as in
section 2.1.12 The difference here compared to section 4 is that now the
authorities choose the level of eo, not the shareholders. The other altemative is
that the authorities intervene by moving e(t) to eE. This correspon-ds to the case
analyzed above. The shareholders do not know ex ante what the banking policy
is. Let p denote the probability that banking policy is such that the authorities
move e(t) to eE- The probability that eD tums out to be an absorbing barrier is
thus l-p.
The above considerations lead to the following boundary condition:
(17)
where in V(..,..,..) the first argument refers to the earnings level, the second to
whether or not intervention has occurred and the last to the probability of the
Iower boundary not being an absorbing barrier. Thus VA(eD, 0, p) denotes the
value of the bank at earnings level eD, when intervention has not occurred and
the probabiIity that the Iower boundary is not an absorbing barrier is p.
Correspondingly, VB(eE, 1, p) denotes the vaIue when intervention has occurred
and the publie authority moves e(t) to eE. 1require V(eD, 1, 0) to be zero.
The second value-matching condition is:
(18)
Furthermore, 1use the famiIiar value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at
eL: VB(eL, 1, p) =Vc(eL, 1, p) and V~(eL' 1, p) =V~(eL' 1, p).
The vaIue of the bank can be written as
V A(e,O,p) =!:. +~J (p -1))., + (peE-eD) +pBlexp(~leE)+PB2eXP(~2eE)]
r2 r l r r (19)
exp(~2eD)-lexp(~2e),
where
12 In Norway the parliament adopted legislative amendments in November 1991 which gave the
government the right to write down the old share capital against losses disclosed in the audited
interim accounts in certain circumstances. In other words, authorities were given the right to
intervene against the will of the orginal share holders. This right was used in the case of
Cristiania and Fokus banks.
21If p = 1, equation (19) collapses to equation (16)~ If P =0, equation (19)
coIlapses to equation (11).
Figure 4 shows the value of a bank when p = 0.25 and 0.75. c is 0.5.
Otherwise the parameter values are the same as in figure 1. It is evident that the
lower the p, the lower the vaIue of the bank. Note also that by increasing
uncertainty authorities can correct some of the disturbed incentives shareholders
may have. That is because the higher the probabiIity of a non-intervention
regime, the Iower the expected vaIue of bank support (due to intervention) ta
the shareholders.
The policy implication of the above analysis is that the authorities should
keep some uncertainty on the future policy (assuming that bank support is
undervalued).13 If there is no undervaluation of the bank support (and the
shareholders know it), there is also no need for uncertainty.
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Figure 4 facilates an analysis of the impact of the policy announcements, which
change the expectations as ta future banking policy regimes.
An announcement may concem, for example, how the publie sector will
support banks in funding themselves in the market. It is assumed that this
decreases the perceived probability that the lower boundary is an absorbing one.
This impIies a Iower vaIue for p, which in tum causes the vaIue of the bank ta
13 Note, however, that there are typically other considerations that argue that uncertainty should
be lowered.
22move from the lower curve to the upper curve in figure 4. The change in p
generates the jump in the bank's value if the earnings are low enough. The
example illustrates that the changes in perceived banking policy regime can
have dramatic effects on the value of the bank.
A\Jove 1 have discussed the possible moral hazard problems raised by
mispriced bank support. However, very little has been said so far about
incentives faced by the govemment. This is done next.
Figure 5 shows the value of the bank for three different cases. The
parameter values used are the following: A=0.1, r =0.085, cr = 0.40,
en = -2.0, eE = 0.0 and eL = 1.0 and c = 1.0. V(e) gives the value of the bank
without government intervention. The share-holders close the bank at e~, which
is -1.72. V(e,0,0.25) denotes the value of the bank with uncertain intervention
and p =0.25. V(e,0,0.75) corresponds to the case where p =0.75.
The 25 % probability of (underpriced) government support ensures that
shareholders have an incentives to invest new capital in the bank at earnings
levels where they otherwise would have already closed the bank. Recall that
negative earnings imply capital injections. This means that by keeping up hope
of bank support the goverment can get more capital from the orginal
shareholders.
The above examples imply that the result of underpriced bank support can
have ambigious effects. First, the shareholders may have an incentive to
deerease earnings. On the other hand, by promising (possible) underpriced bank
support the government can increase shareholders~ capital injections into the
bank.
Finally, note that in above example the incentive problems are associated
with the publie sector. The govemment has an incentive to cheat shareholders
by giving the impression that the bank's share capital will not be nullified in
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236 Conclusions
During a banking crlSlS investors face at least two kinds of uncertainty
concerning the value of a bank. First, how the bank will manage its affairs
during the recession. Second, how the publie sector will react to a banking
crisis.
Nordic countries faced banking crises during the late 1980s and early
1990s. They provide differing examples of how public authorities react to a
crisis. In Norway, alI the major commercial banks' initial share capital was
nullified. In Sweden and Finland, the approach has been different. In the later
countries the aim has been to provide banks with support so that they can get
through the recession.
This paper studies the value of a bank under different banking policy
regimes. T.he value of a bank depends crucially on the banking policy regime,
as the earnings and solvency ratio approach their lower boundaries. The results
also show that uncertainty as to banking policy can have a major impact on the
bank's share value dynamies. The model produces moral hazard problems: in
some cases the shareholders are better off as earnings decrease. The results also
indicate that in some cases the publie sector should keep up a degree of
uncertainty about it's future policy. A higher level of uncertainty can decrease
the incentive problems.
However, a bank subsidy can also have positive effects on shareholders'
incentives. The results show that the bank shareholders are more willing to
inject new capital into bank if they know that the public sector will (possibly)
subsize the bank in the case af financial distress. The model also impiies that
the government may have an incentive to cheat the bank shareholders in order
to induce further capital injections from the shareholders.
24Appendix
In the following 1 present the boundary conditions and corresponding equations
used in sections 5.1 and 5.2.
(A1)
(A3)
1 assume that eE < eL.
(A4)
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